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1 Executive Summary
Awarding executives long-term incentive pay based on firm performance is often described 
as a natural way to improve firm performance. This brief uses an analytical approach to 
examine that proposed relationship. We first document the prevalence of performance-based 
long-term incentive (P B  LTI) measures and the trends in the relative size of these measures 
compared to aggregate measures of compensation. We then compare the characteristics and 
performance of firms that have implemented a PB  LTI measure in the past to those that 
have not. In order to understand the impact of PB LTI awards on firm performance, we 
separately assess the roles of the existence of the PB LTI measures, the relative size of the 
measures, and the type of PB LTI measure on firm performance.
K ey  F indings:
* In 2013, 88 percent of the 2014 S&P 500 firms offered PB LTI plans to one of their top 
five named executive officers (NEO) - nearly a 40 percent increase from the level of 64 
percent in 2006.
* There has been an increase in the weight of PB LTI awards relative to both all long­
term incentive pay and total direct compensation over the past eight years among NEOs. 
Conditional upon having a PB LTI award, the average award has risen from 51 percent 
of all LTI in 2006 to 56 percent in 2013.
* The increasing share of LTI that is performance-based is meaningful as LTI’s share of 
TDC has jumped from 56 percent to 62 percent between 2006 and 2013.
* The inclusion of PB LTI plans is observed across all sectors, with particularly large uptake 
in the Information Technology and Consumer Discretionary sectors.
* There are differences in the firms that include PB LTI awards in the compensation plans 
of their executives compared to those that do not include PB LTI awards. Firms with PB
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LTI awards tend to experience lower returns (as measured by 10 year compound annual 
growth rates (CAGR) of Net Income, EBIT, EPS, ROA, and Free Cash Flow).
* Our models indicate a pattern of within-year increases of PB LTI on firm performance 
followed by losses in subsequent years.
^  Contemporaneous estimates of the impact of a PB LTI plan on performance are positive 
for one and three year TSR; however, we find a pattern of negative estimates for the 
one and two year lags.
^  Results of the role of the relative weight of PB LTI plans on firm performance follow 
a similar pattern of positive within year estimates followed by negative estimates in 
lagged years when examining 1 year TSR and EPS growth. There is evidence of a 
mostly positive impact on ROE and ROIC when increasing the weight of the plans.
* Comparing findings by level of analysis, i.e., top five NEOs, CEOs, and top five NEOs 
excluding CEOs, across all subanalyses showed similar estimates and patterns.
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2 Data
The firms studied in this brief were identified using the 2014 S&P 500 index. A rich longi­
tudinal dataset was constructed using compensation data and firm financial data covering 
fiscal years 2006 through 2013.1 The information regarding compensation was derived from 
Equilar's executive compensation data. These data contain detailed records of the com­
pensation types and amounts for named executive officers from firms in our sample. For 
example, we observe base salary, bonus payouts, stock awards, option awards, and several 
types of incentive plan awards. Measures of firm performance include 1, 3 and 5-year TSR 
as well as annual measures of return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) growth, total 
revenue growth, and return on invested capital (ROIC). Firm performance measures came 
from Capital IQ.2
3 Methodology
To examine how the inclusion of PB LTI plans impacts firm performance, we used both 
descriptive analysis and also regression analysis. The descriptive analysis compared the raw 
patterns among groups of firms with and without PB LTI plans over time. The resulting 
tables and figures are valuable in understanding the unconditional relationship between PB 
LTI plans and firm performance. All analyses were conducted on three subsamples of ex­
ecutives: top five proxy-listed NEOs, CEOs only, and top five proxy-listed NEOs excluding 
CEOs.
Regression analysis is used to as a way to control for other factors that might obscure 
the role of PB LTI measures on firm performance. Our baseline model uses the following
1The analytical sample excluded firms due to extreme values: loses of 195 observations. Additionally, 
1,396 firm-year observations were removed from the sample when key data elements were missing. The final 
baseline sample consisted of 2,249 firm-year observations, which were associated with 367 firms.
2 We would like to thank Pearl Meyer for providing us with the data used in this brief and also for con­
structing the key measures of performance-based compensation, long-term incentive pay, total compensation, 
and others.
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Ordinary Least Squares regression framework:
Yit — 0 l +  Z it02 +  Sit ft 3 +  Ctj3 4 +  05 X it +  fisXij-l  +  3 7X i,t-2 +  Cit (1)
La represents a given performance measure for firm i in fiscal year t. The set of firm 
performance measures studied in this brief are 1-year TSR, 3-year TSR, 5-year TSR, ROE, 
EPS growth, total revenue growth, and ROIC. Zit is a set of control variables including 
functions of market capitalization and an indicator for change in CEO. Our model also 
accounts for sector performance and year fixed effects with Sit and Ct, respectively. The key 
variables in this project are the PB LTI measures represented by X it, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one when a firm has any executive in the respective sample, i.e., top five 
NEOs, CEOs, or top five NEOs excluding CEOs, with a PB LTI plan during the current 
fiscal year. To analyze the role of weight on performance, Xit is set to the firm-level average, 
given the respective sample, of the ratio of PB LTI award to either LTI or TDC. Our baseline 
model includes two lags of X it to account for a delay between PB LTI plan implementation 
and impact on firm performance. Finally, the remaining error in the model is captured by 
eit, which is clustered at the firm level.
Multiple extensions of the baseline model were investigated to assess the sensitivity of 
our findings. One extension replaced the sector fixed effects with firm effects, which allows 
the model to control for unobserved firm-specific and fixed attributes. We also considered 
the impact of partitioning the sample across firm size and PB LTI plan history. Additional 
sensitivity checks include removing the Financial sector from the analysis and running models 
with a richer set of lag measures.
4 Findings
One of the most striking features of PB LTI plans among Fortune 500 firms is how common 
they have become. Table 1 shows that the share of firms offering their NEOs PB LTI plans
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has increased from 64 percent of firms in 2006 to 88 percent of firms in 2013. Put another 
way, only one in ten Fortune 500 firms does not offer a PB LTI award to their NEOs. This 
high level of prevalence is not driven by PB LTI awards only being offered to CEOs as 
evidenced by the comparable prevalence levels among CEOs and top five NEOs excluding 
CEOs. Table 2 shows that firms in all sectors have increasingly included PB LTI plans in 
the compensation of their executives.
With an understanding of the pervasiveness of PB LTI awards, we next assessed the 
relative size of the PB LTI awards. Table 3 examines how the weight of PB LTI relative 
to LTI and TDC has changed over time. The average weight of PB LTI plans has been 
increasing over time among all firms (the unconditional columns); though the fast growth 
rate is influenced by the rapid increase in the prevalence of these awards. For the firms that 
actually offer PB LTI plans (conditional columns), the weight of the plans has increased 
more modestly over the sample time period, e.g., NEO PB LTI weight grew from 51 percent 
of LTI to 56 percent. Given the growth of LTI during this same time period, the share of 
total compensation coming from PB LTI increased from 28 percent to 35 percent.3
In an effort to understand the prevalence and impact of specific components of PB LTI 
awards, we worked with the executive compensation consulting firm Pearl Meyer to categorize 
the thirty-one individual incentive pay metrics reported within the Equilar data into six 
strategically-aligned groups. The groups and individual metrics are reported in Table 4: 
Cash Flow, Growth, Market-Based, Profitability, Returns, and Other.
The trends in the prevalence of the IP categories among all firms are described in Table 
5. We find that each of the six categories became more common over time. For example, 
30 percent of firms offered Market-Based metrics to their NEOs in 2006 while 51 percent 
offered Market-Based metrics in 2013. Table 6 reports the same prevalency rates but only 
considers firms that offer at least one of their top five NEOs a PB LTI award. Conditioning 
on PB LTI award changes the patterns observed in Table 5. Here we find that only Cash
3 The share of total direct compensation attributed to LTI increased from 56 percent in 2006 to 62 percent 
in 2013.
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Flow, Growth, and Market-Based metrics are becoming more common with the other three 
groups becoming slightly less prevalent. Columns 7 and 8 report the number of individual 
metrics and categories, respectively, in the NEOs plans. The average number of individual 
measures among NEOs with a PB LTI award has increased by 17 percent from 2.36 to 2.75 
metrics. At the same time, the number of unique categories only increased by 11 percent 
(1.75 to 1.94). The slower growth rate of categories and higher value in individual measures 
describe a situation where firms are offering NEOs multiple metrics from within the same 
incentive pay category.
We next compared the performance of firms based on their prior history of offering PB 
LTI awards to their NEOs. Table 7 shows the results of an analysis that separated firms 
into one of three groups: those that always offered a PB LTI awards to their NEOs, those 
that never offered the awards, and those that changed between offering and not. Results 
indicate the firms that change or always had a PB LTI award have lower returns in terms 
of Net Income, EBIT, EPS, and ROA. While Table 7 provides evidence of differences in 
performance being related to a firm’s history offering PB LTI awards, these estimates may 
be influenced by other factors associated to the firm.
A series of regression analyses were implemented in an attempt to isolate the role of 
PB LTI awards on firm performance. Tables 8 through 11 report the estimates from our 
baseline model, described in Equation 1, of the relationship between the inclusion of PB 
LTI awards and performance. The tables reveal a pattern of positive within year increases 
followed by negative estimates in lagged years. For example, column 2 of Table 8 indicates 
that including a PB LTI plan in the current year predicts a 10.7 percentage point jump in 
1-year TSR. At the same time, we also find that having a PB LTI plan last year (two years 
ago) predicts a 7.2 (10.3) percentage point decline in 1-year TSR. Looking at our preferred 
specifications in the four columns reported for each dependent variable, we find evidence 
of positive contemporaneous estimates on 1-year TSR, 3-year TSR, and ROE but negative 
lagged estimates for 1-year TSR, 3-year TSR, and 5-year TSR.
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Estimates of the relative size of PB LTI to LTI on firm performance, reported in Tables 
12 through 15, continue to present evidence of a short-term bump followed by a decline in 
firm performance. Notably, a different set of firm performance measures are impacted by 
changes in the weight compared to the introduction or removal of a PB LTI plan. Here we 
find that the weight of PB LTI to LTI most directly predicts ROE, EPS Growth, and ROIC. 
In fact, increasing the weight of PB LTI plans predicts only a positive increase in ROE and 
ROIC with no subsequent decline, i.e., increasing the share of LTI that is performance based 
by 1 percentage point is associated with between a 0.020 and 0.026 percentage point increase 
in ROIC.
In addition to the baseline analysis, we performed a series of sensitivity checks, examining 
the relative impact of market capitalization, financial sector, PB LTI offering pattern, and 
richer five year lag structure. The positive relationship between contemporaneous PB LTI 
plans is only present in Fortune 500 firms with lower market capitalization. Excluding firms 
from the Financial sector weakens the evidence of the positive contemporaneous relationships 
with PB LTI plans. Neither restricting the analysis to only those firms with changing PB 
LTI policy nor extending the model to include five lags change the baseline findings other 
than attenuating the results. Additionally, we explored the relationship between specific 
incentive pay categories on firm performance but found most estimates to be insignificant. 
Thus, these findings do not point to a particular category as driving the broader PB LTI 
impact found earlier.
5 Discussion and Future Direction
Currently, almost ninety percent of the 2014 S&P 500 firms offer PB LTI plans to their named 
executive officers - a forty percent increase between 2006 and 2013. The relative value of 
these PB LTI plans has also increased over time, even among those firms that offer the plans, 
with PB LTI awards now representing just over one third of the total direct compensation
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for NEOs. Breaking all PB LTI into six major categories reveals that half of those categories 
have growth while the other half remain stable or have slightly decreased.
Differences are observable in the firms that include PB LTI awards into the compensation 
plans of their NEOs compared to those that do not. Firms with PB LTI plans experience 
poorer performance in key areas. That said, the decision to use PB LTI awards may actually 
have been a response by the board to improve poor performance among those firms with 
any PB LTI history. In a similar vein, firms that have been performing well may not feel 
the need to change their compensation structure. Thus, the usage of PB LTI awards may 
be endogenous to observed firm performance, so care should be used when drawing causal 
implications from descriptive statistics.
Our baseline models examined the impact of the inclusion and size of PB LTI awards on 
firm performance. Evidence suggests that the inclusion of these plans results in short-term 
increases in performance followed by later declines. Alternatively, increasing the weight 
of the plans has a more positive impact overall, though there was still some evidence of 
later losses. While these models provide a clearer understanding of the impact of PB LTI 
awards on firm performance than the purely descriptive analyses, they still only describe the 
statistical relationship and are not causal.
This work builds upon our prior work exploring the role of TSR awards on firm per­
formance. In this project, we aimed to understand how the role of the broader category 
of PB LTI is related to firm performance and which subcomponents may be driving that 
relationship. Future steps may include examining the role of compensation complexity on 
the relationship between incentive pay and firm performance.
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6 Appendix
This appendix provides variable definitions for key measures used in this study.
• TSR outcome measures, where the closing price is adjusted for dividends
— 1-Year TSR: (Fiscal year end stock price/previous fiscal year end stock price)-1
— 3-Year TSR: {(Fiscal year end stock price/three fiscal year priors end stock 
price)(1/3)}-1
— 5-Year TSR: {(Fiscal year end stock price/five fiscal year priors end stock price)(1 /5 )}- 
1
• TDC measure
— TDC =  Long-Term Incentives +  Base Salary +  Short-Term Portion of NEIP 
Compensation +  Bonus
• LTI measure
— LTI =  Grant Date Present Value of Securities +  Grant Date Present Value of 
Option (FAS 123(R)) +  Grant Date Present Value of Target Award
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7 Tables
Table 1: Percent of Firms with PB LTI 
Plans
Top 5 CEO Top 5
Excluding CEO
2006 63.60 62.18 62.76
2007 65.75 62.35 64.83
2008 66.87 63.04 65.94
2009 68.01 64.38 67.70
2010 71.64 69.88 71.34
2011 78.10 76.59 77.52
2012 85.24 83.84 84.68
2013 88.08 86.49 87.31
Means of the share of firms with PB LTI 
plans by three samples: top 5 NEOs, CEOs, 
and top 5 NEOs excluding CEOs.
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Table 2: Share of Firms with PB LTI Plan by Sector (Top 5)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Energy 0.58 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.71 0.82 0.85
(31 ) ( 34 ) ( 32 ) ( 33 ) ( 33 ) ( 35 ) ( 38 ) ( 39 )
Materials 0.75 0.71 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.93
(24 ) ( 28 ) ( 27 ) ( 27 ) ( 26 ) ( 29 ) ( 29 ) ( 28 )
Industrials 0.63 0.70 0.61 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.92
(41) ( 53 ) ( 51 ) ( 52 ) ( 52 ) ( 50 ) ( 53 ) ( 59 )
Consumer Discretionary 0.52 0.56 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.84 0.89
(23 ) ( 50 ) ( 49 ) ( 50 ) ( 57 ) ( 59 ) ( 58 ) (6 4 )
Consumer Staples 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.77 0.75 0.88 0.90 0.91
( 15) ( 33 ) ( 29 ) ( 30 ) ( 32 ) ( 32 ) ( 30 ) ( 32 )
Health Care 0.71 0.84 0.68 0.74 0.83 0.85 0.93 0.94
(14) ( 19) ( 22 ) ( 23 ) ( 23 ) ( 26 ) ( 29 ) ( 31 )
Financials 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.39 0.46 0.64 0.83 0.82
(49 ) ( 52 ) ( 53 ) (4 6 ) ( 52 ) ( 50 ) ( 52 ) ( 56 )
Information Technology 0.30 0.54 0.59 0.57 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.74
( 10) ( 26 ) ( 29 ) ( 28 ) ( 27 ) ( 34 ) ( 36 ) (4 2 )
Telecommunication Services 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.67 1.00 1.00
(4) (4) (3) (4) (5) (3) (5) (5)
Utilities 0.89 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00
(28 ) ( 28 ) ( 28 ) ( 29 ) ( 28 ) ( 29 ) ( 29 ) ( 30 )
Means with number of observations in parentheses for the sample of the top 5 NEOs.
Table 3: Weight of PB LTI Plan Relative to LTI and TDC
Top 5 CEO Top 5 Excluding CEO
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
(1) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7 ) (8 ) (9 ) ( 10) (11) (12)
Year LTI TDC LTI TDC LTI TDC LTI TDC LTI TDC LTI TDC
2006 32.80 19.13 50.50 30.07 35.74 21.16 54.09 34.03 32.79 17.59 50.94 28.03
2007 33.20 19.13 49.57 29.10 35.59 20.58 53.57 32.90 32.99 17.88 49.80 27.58
2008 34.13 21.02 50.24 31.43 36.90 23.25 55.27 36.76 33.35 19.19 49.78 29.10
2009 36.07 21.75 52.38 31.98 37.85 23.23 55.49 36.09 35.98 20.44 52.49 30.19
2010 38.31 22.05 52.35 30.78 40.42 24.13 55.58 34.53 37.42 20.29 51.35 28.43
2011 41.43 24.74 52.29 31.68 43.38 26.86 54.51 35.07 40.67 22.82 51.71 29.43
2012 47.13 28.85 54.83 33.85 49.66 31.51 57.57 37.58 45.92 26.45 53.78 31.23
2013 49.73 30.88 56.02 35.05 52.55 34.64 59.81 39.94 47.78 27.75 54.30 31.78
Means of the weight of PB LTI plans by three samples: top 5 NEOs, CEOs, and top 5 NEOs excluding 
CEOs. Unconditional estimates include firms with zero individuals (with respect to the sample) reported to 
have a PB LTI plan. Conditional estimates exclude firms with zero individuals (with respect to the sample) 
reported to have a PB LTI plan.
7.1 Trends in IP Categories
Table 4: Separating IP Metrics in Strategically-Aligned Cat­
egories
IP Award Bin IP Award Metric
Cash Flow Cash Flow 
EBITDA
Growth (Top Line) Market Share 
Revenue
Market-Based Absolute TSR 
Market Capitalization 
Relative TSR 
Stock Price
Profitability
Total TSR (Relative and Absolute) 
EPS
EPS /  Net Income 
Gross Profit /  Margin 
Net Income
Operating Income /  Margin 
ROS
Returns EVA
ROC /  ROIC
ROE
ROA
Other Asset/Asset Ratio 
Cost/Cost Ratio 
Customer Satisfaction 
Debt Leverage/Debt Ratios 
Division Performance 
Environmental 
Industry Specific 
N /A
Other Financial 
Other Non-Financial 
Other Ratios 
Safety
The ICS thanks Pearl Meyer for categorizing the individual met­
rics into the above six groups.
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Table 5: Prevalence of IP Categories Over Time - All Firms (Top 5)
IP Category Average IP Count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Cash Flow Growth Market-Based Profitability Returns Other Individual Measures Categories
2006 6.69 7.95 30.13 29.29 20.92 11.72 1.44 1.07
2007 7.03 11.01 28.44 32.42 21.71 11.31 1.48 1.12
2008 6.81 11.15 30.34 32.51 20.12 12.38 1.51 1.13
2009 9.32 10.56 30.75 35.09 18.63 12.42 1.54 1.17
2010 8.96 12.54 35.82 37.31 20.90 11.04 1.71 1.27
2011 11.24 15.56 37.18 40.06 22.19 13.54 1.90 1.40
2012 11.98 18.11 45.68 39.00 25.07 16.16 2.21 1.56
2013 13.21 17.36 50.78 39.90 28.24 15.54 2.33 1.65
The left panels reports the means of the share of firms with each of the six IP categories for all firms by three samples: top 
5 NEOs, CEOs, and top 5 NEOs excluding CEOs. The right panels presents the average number of metrics and categories 
by firm.
Table 6: Prevalence of IP Categories Over Time - Firms With PB LTI (Top 5)
IP Category Average IP Count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Cash Flow Growth Market-Based Profitability Returns Other Individual Measures Categories
2006 10.96 13.01 49.32 47.95 34.25 19.18 2.36 1.75
2007 11.39 17.82 46.04 52.48 35.15 18.32 2.39 1.81
2008 10.84 17.73 48.28 51.72 32.02 19.70 2.40 1.80
2009 14.08 15.96 46.48 53.05 28.17 18.78 2.33 1.77
2010 12.71 17.80 50.85 52.97 29.66 15.68 2.42 1.80
2011 15.00 20.77 49.62 53.46 29.62 18.08 2.53 1.87
2012 14.83 22.41 56.55 48.28 31.03 20.00 2.73 1.93
2013 15.55 20.43 59.76 46.95 33.23 18.29 2.75 1.94
The left panels reports the means of the share of firms with each of the six IP categories for firms offering PB LTI awards 
by three samples: top 5 NEOs, CEOs, and top 5 NEOs excluding CEOs. The right panels presents the average number of 
metrics and categories by firm.
Table 7: Firm Characteristics by PB LTI Plan Pattern (Top 5)
Always PB LTI Change PB LTI Never PB LTI
Market Cap - Avg 23690.79 25687.94 26379.44
(0.72) (0.94)
Total Revenue - Avg 20476.85 17960.63 22355.41
(0.78) (0.55)
10 Yr Net Inc CAGR 7.10 7.12 14.64
(0.00) (0.00)
10 Yr ROIC CAGR 0.69 0.48 3.76
(0.07) (0.06)
10 Yr EBIT CAGR 7.26 6.92 15.62
(0.00) (0.00)
10 Yr EPS CAGR 7.00 6.33 13.38
(0.00) (0.00)
10 Yr ROA CAGR 0.06 0.06 0.08
(0.01) (0.03)
10 Yr ROE CAGR 0.16 0.15 0.26
(0.51) (0.02)
10 Yr FCF CAGR 6.65 7.23 13.25
(0.03) (0.02)
Observations 210 122 35
Means with p-values in parentheses for the sample of the top five NEOs. Firms 
are grouped into three groups based on the sample period: those that always had 
a PB LTI plan, those that never had a PB LTI plan, and those that changed their 
PB LTI plans by either introducing or removing them.
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Table 8: Estimates of PB LTI Plans on 1-Year TSR and 3-Year TSR
1-Year TSR 3-Year TSR
(1) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI Plan 3.610 10.704*** 5.168 3.734 0.635 3.487* 3.348* 3.113*
(2.961) (3.126) (3.984) (4.082) (1.362) (1.409) ( 1.5 11 ) (1.481)
PB LTI Plan - 1 Lag -2.168 -7.163* -1.781 -9.661** 1.029 -1.578 1.479 -2.555
(2.764) (3.322) (3.250) (3.164) (1.195) (1.294) (1.455) (1.354)
PB LTI Plan - 2 Lags -10.275** -10.833*** -3.282* -2.547
(3.162) (2.904) (1.468) (1.539)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247
R2 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.15
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.14
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using 
dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 10 sectors 
under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are 
represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p <
0.01, * * * p  <  0.001
Table 9: Estimates of PB LTI Plans on 5-Year TSR and ROE
5-Year TSR ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI Plan -2.249* -0.515 -0.283 -0.425 1.552 1.801 1.120 1.163
(1.073) (1.089) (1.084) (1.098) (1.177) ( 1-171) (0.852) (0.877)
PB LTI Plan - 1 Lag 2.119** 0.277 2.103* -0.278 1.088 0.464 0.581 0.188
(0.791) (0.830) (0.855) (0.794) (0.862) (0.729) (0.714) (0.661)
PB LTI Plan - 2 Lags -1.669 -1.499 0.206 0.161
(0.858) (0.937) (0.928) (0.909)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247
R2 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.04
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured 
using dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 
10 sectors under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm 
fixed effects are represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 10: Estimates of PB LTI Plans on EPS Growth and Total Revenue Growth
EPS Growth Total Revenue Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI Plan 9.807 19.286 32.898 30.231 -1.884 -1.450 0.296 0.280
(13.081) (10.589) (21.099) (24.286) (0.960) (0.997) ( 1-117) (1.122)
PB LTI Plan - 1 Lag -15.031 -13.884 -9.142 -17.247 0.323 0.412 1.575 1.087
(13.982) (14.624) (17.111) (16.080) (0.882) (0.979) (1.059) (1.031)
PB LTI Plan - 2 Lags -24.676 -17.605 -1.165 -0.268
(20.676) (26.024) (0.987) (1.152)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247 2249 2247
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.19
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using 
dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 10 sectors 
under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are 
represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p <
0.01, * * * p  <  0.001
Table 11: Estimates of PB LTI Plans on ROIC
ROIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PB LTI Plan 0.285 0.468 0.621 0.642
(0.833) (0.845) (0.528) (0.530)
PB LTI Plan - 1 Lag -0.008 -0.201 -0.104 -0.425
(0.595) (0.437) (0.411) (0.394)
PB LTI Plan - 2 Lags -0.175 0.027
(0.625) (0.475)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2247 2249 2247
R2 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.07
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using dummy variables to 
identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are 
based on the 10 sectors under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Ma­
terials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommuni­
cation Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are represented 
by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 12: Estimates of PB LTI/LTI on 1-Year TSR and 3-Year TSR
1-Year TSR 3-Year TSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI to LTI 0.084 0.162*** 0.109 0.078 0.000 0.024 0.034 0.028
(0.046) (0.049) (0.056) (0.054) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)
PB LTI to LTI - 1 Lag -0.083 -0.153** -0.043 -0.145* 0.020 -0.005 0.027 -0.019
(0.047) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
PB LTI to LTI - 2 Lags -0.097* -0.107* -0.029 -0.019
(0.049) (0.054) (0.032) (0.033)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205
R2 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.15
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.14
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using 
dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 10 sectors 
under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are 
represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance levels:*p < 0.05, **p <
0.01, * * * p  <  0.001
Table 13: Estimates of PB LTI/LTI on 5-Year TSR and ROE
5-Year TSR ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI to LTI -0.022 -0.004 0.017 0.016 0.041* 0.040* 0.036* 0.037*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
PB LTI to LTI - 1 Lag 0.022 0.007 0.042* 0.015 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.013
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
PB LTI to LTI - 2 Lags -0.026 -0.016 -0.001 0.013
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205
R2 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using 
dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 10 sectors 
under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are 
represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance levels: * p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 14: Estimates of PB LTI/LTI on EPS Growth and Total Revenue Growth
EPS Growth Total Revenue Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PB LTI to LTI 0.767** 0.872** 1.050* 1.092* - 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.032
(0.253) (0.300) (0.425) (0.435) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
PB LTI to LTI - 1 Lag -0.660** -0.711** -0.591** -0.721*** -0.008 -0.005 0.011 0.001
(0.225) (0.231) (0.191) (0.213) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023)
PB LTI to LTI - 2 Lags -0.194 -0.135 -0.018 - 0.000
(0.271) (0.281) (0.018) (0.021)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205 2249 2205
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.18
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using 
dummy variables to identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are based on the 10 sectors 
under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are 
represented by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, * * * p  <  0.001
Table 15: Estimates of PB LTI/LTI on ROIC
ROIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PB LTI Plan 0.026* 0.025* 0.021* 0.020*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
PB LTI Plan - 1 Lag -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
PB LTI Plan - 2 Lags -0.006 0.005
(0.011) (0.008)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 2249 2205 2249 2205
R2 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.07
Regression point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
Time fixed effects (FE) are captured using dummy variables to 
identify each year within the panel. The sector fixed effects are 
based on the 10 sectors under the two-digit GICS: Energy, Ma­
terials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommuni­
cation Services, and Utilities. Firm fixed effects are represented 
by a set of dummy variables that separately identifies each firm. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
